zip: Arbitrary file write outside the extraction directory, because ZipArchive::extract validates symlink targets lexically. (The defense against CVE-2025-29787 was broken in v7.2.0)
At a glance
Severity
HIGH 7.4
EPSS
EPSS 0.43 % · percentile 37 (2026-10-27)
State
PUBLISHED
Published
Updated
Assigner
GitHub_M
NVD status
Awaiting Analysis
Description
zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 7.2.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract and ZipArchive::extract_unwrapped_root_dir use safe_prepare_path in src/read/zipfile.rs and simplified_components in src/path.rs to validate symbolic link targets with a lexical prefix comparison rather than resolving each intermediate link. An attacker who knows or can guess the absolute extraction destination can create a chain whose apparent target remains under the destination while an intermediate symlink resolves outside it, allowing attacker-controlled files to be created or overwritten with the extracting process's privileges. On Windows, discarded drive and UNC prefixes can permit a single-link escape when the process has SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, such as through administrator rights or Developer Mode. This regression is distinct from CVE-2025-29787. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.
